Are the well-known facts about urbanization in the United States also true for the developing world? We compare American metropolitan areas with analogous geographic units in Brazil, China and India. Both Gibrat's Law and Zipf's Law seem to hold as well in Brazil as in the U.S., but China and India look quite different. In Brazil and China, the implications of the spatial equilibrium hypothesis, the central organizing idea of urban economics, are not rejected. The India data, however, repeatedly rejects tests inspired by the spatial equilibrium assumption. One hypothesis is that spatial equilibrium only emerges with economic development, as markets replace social relationships and as human capital spreads more widely. In all four countries there is strong evidence of agglomeration economies and human capital externalities. The correlation between density and earnings is stronger in both China and India than in the U.S., strongest in China. In India the gap between urban and rural wages is huge, but the correlation between city size and earnings is more modest. The cross-sectional relationship between area-level skills and both earnings and area-level growth are also stronger in the developing world than in the U.S. The forces that drive urban success seem similar in the rich and poor world, even if limited migration and difficult housing markets make it harder for a spatial equilibrium to develop.
Introduction
The majority of the world's urban population will soon live in places that are far poorer than the U.S. and Europe. This creates a knowledge mismatch, for urban economists have predominantly focused on the cities of the wealthy west. The relevance of the long literatures on wealthy world urbanization depends on the similarity between poor world urbanization and rich world urbanization. This paper asks whether the major stylized facts about cities in the U.S. also hold for Brazil, China and India.
Economists frequently assume that our models work everywhere, although different levels of income and education may create marginal differences. Yet the enormous social and political differences between the U.S. and countries like Brazil, India and China may belie that assumption. For example, the central organizing model of urban economics is the spatial equilibrium hypoth-R We thank William Strange and an anonymous referee for excellent comments and suggestions. We acknowledge support from the Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Chauvin acknowledges support from the Center for International Development at Harvard.
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esis, which in its standard version assumes free mobility across metropolitan areas. Does that assumption make sense in a country like China, which historically imposed legal barriers to mobility such as the Hukuo system ( Au and Henderson, 2006b )? We focus on three major areas of research: core facts about city size, characterized by Zipf's and Gibrat's Law; the Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium; and the determinants of urban success, including agglomeration economies and human capital effects on wages and on city growth. The transferability of Zipf's and Gibrat's Law is of primarily academic interest. The transferability of the spatial equilibrium framework determines our ability to rely on that framework's many implications, such as the implication that the benefits of new infrastructure for local renters will be muted by higher prices. Economists might want to be far more circumspect about championing human capital and agglomeration if there is little evidence that human capital externalities and agglomeration economies exist in the developing world.
Section 2 of this paper describes the data, which can be particularly problematic in the developing world. For the U.S., we will work with Census-defined metropolitan areas using standardized geographic boundaries based on the latest definitions. We tried to duplicate this structure for the other three countries, relying whenever possible on standard Census-like products, but even the definition of metropolitan areas could be difficult. In the case of India, for example, we use districts, but include only the urban population. Our time frame runs from 1980 to 2010.
In Section 3 we present the basic facts about the distributions of populations across city sizes. While Zipf's Law is often considered to be a universal truth, like Soo (2014) we do not find it so. Standard statistical tests reject the hypothesis that China, India and the U.S. are characterized by the same power law distribution. Brazil, and most notably China and India, have fewer extremely large sizes than would be predicted by Zipf's Law. Gibrat's Law, which claims that growth rates are independent of initial population levels, holds roughly for the U.S. and Brazil. It does not hold for India and China. In both of these countries, urban population levels show substantial mean reversion from 1980 to 2010. Following the logic of Gabaix (1999) , the failure of Gibrat's Law in these countries may explain why Zipf's Law also fails to hold, perhaps because India and China are still finding their way towards an urban steady state.
Section 4 turns to spatial equilibrium, which has long been the organizing principle of urban economics. We do not focus on the intra-urban implications of the spatial equilibrium hypothesis, developed by Alonso (1964) , but rather than inter-urban implications developed by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) . Perhaps the most basic implication of that model is that the advantages of a place, such as particularly good weather, should be offset by countervailing disadvantages, such as long commutes. Higher wages should be offset by either lower amenities or higher housing costs. When there are forces that limit mobility, including placespecific tastes and human capital, moving costs or even legal barriers, then the predictions of the spatial equilibrium model will soften. Results that appear to reject a frictionless spatial equilibrium model may not reject a spatial equilibrium model with severe frictions.
In the U.S., a one-log-point increase in area incomes (estimated as the residual from a regression of earnings on human capital and demographics) is associated with a 1.6 log-points increase in annual rents and a 2.9 log-points increase in housing values. The rents-income relationship is actually too small, relative to the predictions of the Rosen-Roback model, unless higher income areas have low amenities or higher levels of unobserved human capital. The values-income relationship is closer to the predictions of the Rosen-Roback framework.
The comparable elasticities of rents to area earnings for Brazil and China are 1.4 and 1.8 respectively. In China, we also estimate a 1.1 elasticity of housing values to area earnings. As in the U.S., the earnings-rent relationships in these countries are quite strong, but smaller in magnitude than theory would suggest. By contrast, the relationship between earnings and rents in India is practically non-existent. This finding can imply either that Indian rental data is problematic, Indian rental markets are dysfunctional, or that the frictionless spatial equilibrium hypothesis does not hold in India. We suspect that the truth involves some combination of all three explanations.
A second implication of spatial equilibrium is that real wages should be lower in areas with better natural amenities. Within the U.S., real wages rise, primarily because housing costs fall, in areas with less temperate climate. In Brazil, real wages are higher in more temperate areas, primarily because nominal wages are much lower in the hottest areas of the country. We suspect this reflects a combination of omitted human capital differences and imperfect mobility. There is no relationship between climate and real wages in either India or China, perhaps because these countries are not rich enough for ordinary workers to sacrifice earnings for nicer weather.
We also look at income and self-reported happiness across space in the U.S., India and China (data is not available for Brazil).
Income and happiness are only weakly related across U.S. cities, which suggests that higher incomes in U.S. metropolitan areas are not generating outsized improvements in personal welfare. Across Chinese and Indian metropolitan areas, the income-happiness relationship appears stronger, even if it is imprecisely measured. A stronger relationship could suggest that differences in unobserved human capital are larger across cities in developing countries than in the U.S., or again, that the spatial equilibrium hypothesis has weaker predictive power in these countries.
The fundamental idea behind spatial equilibrium is that migrants move to equalize welfare levels across space, which seemed distinctly plausible in the highly mobile U.S. Five-year mobility rates in China and Brazil are lower than historic U.S. mobility rates, but the drop in U.S. mobility since 20 0 0 and the rise in Chinese mobility means that the three countries look broadly similar today. India, however, appears to be far less mobile, which may explain why the Indian data does not seem well explained by the frictionless spatial equilibrium model.
The case for a frictionless spatial equilibrium is stronger in the U.S. than in the three developing countries analyzed. Brazil and China do have reasonably high migration rates and a strong correlation between income and housing rents. India has low migration rates and essentially no correlation between income and rents. There is no compensation for less temperate climates in any of the developing countries. We conclude from this subsection that the spatial equilibrium framework can be used, if it is used warily, in Brazil and China. We see little reason for confidence in the standard framework when applied to India.
Section 5 turns to the determinants of local success, such as agglomeration economies and human capital spillovers. As is well known (e.g. Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009 ) , there are two standard problems with agglomeration regressions: unobserved personal heterogeneity and unobserved place-based heterogeneity. We address these issues in the limited ways that are standard in the literature (see Combes and Gobillon, 2015 , for a discussion), controlling for observable human capital and instrumenting for current population levels with population levels from 1980 and the start of the 20th century.
In the U.S., we estimate an agglomeration coefficient of .054 when the logarithm of male earnings is regressed on metropolitan area population. The coefficient on the logarithm of density is slightly smaller (.046). Our Brazilian estimates are similar to those in the U.S. The elasticity of wages with respect to area population is .052 in Brazil, and the elasticity of wages with respect to area density is .026. In the U.S., we estimate a "real wage" (defined as wages controlling for area rents) elasticity of approximately .02. In Brazil, the elasticity is .01, which is not statistically significant.
By contrast, the estimated agglomeration effects are noticeably higher in both China and India, especially with regard to area density. The density elasticity in China is .19. The population elasticity is half the size, which is still higher than the estimated U.S. elasticity, but the Chinese coefficient is not statistically significant. The Indian density elasticity is .076, which is similar to its population elasticity. In India there is also a substantial real-wage premium associated with denser areas and larger urban populations, which again suggests either the unobserved human capital differences are enormous or that India is not characterized by a spatial equilibrium. In China, the real-wage elasticity to density (.052) is comparable to the one in India, but the population elasticity is negative and statistically insignificant.
We then estimate human capital externalities by following Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004) and regressing the logarithm of earnings on area-level education (measured as the share of adults with tertiary degrees), individual education and other demographic variables. We acknowledge the significant problem
